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Abstract This paper presents and analyses a game theoretic model for resource allocation, where agents are status-seeking
and consuming positional goods. We propose a unified framework to study the competition for resources where agents’
preferences are not necessarily ordered according to the absolute amount of goods they consume, but may depend on the
consumption of others as well as on individual valuation of the goods at stake. Our model explicits the relation between
absolute good distribution, individual evaluation and the level of consumption adopted by the opponents; such relation has
the form of a status function. We show that given a certain set of properties, there exists only one possible status function. The
competition mechanism implemented to maximise one own’s status is central in this work. As a result of the mathematical
formulation, we show that the standard utility-maximisation paradigm emerges as a special case (non-positional competition).
We then define a new class of games where the individual evaluations are negotiable and serve only the purpose of maximising
one own’s status.
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1. Introduction
In traditional economics model, individual utility depends
only on the absolute consumption of goods [1]; social inter-
actions, comparisons in the level of consumption and so-
cial ranking are of no relevance for resource distribution.
Though the importance of relative allocation in the economic
behaviour can be traced back to the works of [2] and [3], it is
not before the last decade that researchers in both economics
and social sciences have tried to find alternative frameworks
to describe this type of dynamics.
There is a broad literature of empirical evidence, initiated
by [4] with his famous paradox, [5], [6], [7] and many more,
which confirms that people evaluate their consumption in re-
lation to that of others. As suggested by [8], in order to be
able to understand and model the competition in such a com-
plex scenario, we must reject the hypothesis held by standard
economic models for which the ultimate goal of desire is just
to consume goods.
In fact if we recognise that desire can be driven by non-
material sources such as human desire for distinction, psycho-
logical factors or social practices, then the notion of revealed
preference, based on a na’´ıve idea of utility [9], might not be
adequate to explain a large range of human behaviours.
The term positional good has been coined by [10]. In his
original formulation, positional goods are those goods that
are consumed only for demonstration purposes and whose
role is only to determine the relative standing of an individual
in the community. In contrast, a non-positional good has only
consumption value and cannot be used to gain status in the
society.
The main diﬀerences with public or private goods rely
on the fact that consumption of a positional good generates
positive externalities for the consumer and negative external-
ities for at least one other individual; hence, in this light, a
positional good can be positively or negatively consumed. As
remarked in [8], a positional good is a double rival and double
excludable good in consumption; in fact, agents are rival on
the positive and negative consumption (double rivalry) and,
agents must be able to exclude others from the returns of pos-
itive consumption and be excluded by the returns of negative
consumption (double excludability).
Eventually, if there is a party consuming a positive amount
of positional good, there must be a counterpart who is con-
suming a negative amount of the same good. Based on this
dynamic, which is peculiar only to positional goods, the for-
mulation of the problem of positional resource allocation as
a zero-sum-game is justified [11].
Pagano’s contribution in [11], as Hirsch’s original formu-
lation, is based on the assumption that the positive external-
ities produced by the consumption of a positional good are
balanced by negative externalities of the same magnitude,
resulting in a zero-sum game.
But this is not necessarily true for the negative consump-
tion of a good as perceived by an individual could diﬀer in
intensity from the positive consumption that has generated it.
In the first part of this work, we try to address this problem
by extending the notion of positionality from its boolean for-
mulation (positional/non positional) to a continuous range of
intermediate values from which Hirsch’s categories emerge
and, therefore, Pagano’s model results as a special case.
As pointed out in [12], the concept of positionality is fun-
damental to the idea of status and hence, every economic
model that aims to explain the dynamic of status-seeking
agents, must contain a description of the mechanism that con-
trols positional competition.
Indeed in its most abstract form, rational choice theory
is general enough to incorporate any assumption about the
nature of preferences, including the assumptions about the
objects over which prederences are defined [12]. This means
that utilities are general enough to represent positional pay-
oﬀs. However, in our view, an exhaustive model should con-
tain an explicit formulation of the salient characteristics of
status and not just a black-boxed numerical representation of
well-being. In [12] the authors identify three basic features of
social status: positionality, desiderability and non-tradability.
They intend positionality as the relation of one’s consump-
tion with that of others, desiderability as the agent’s attitude
towards the acquisition of social status and non-tradability
as the absence of a market for status that is an exogenous
conferment of society.
In this work we propose a status function which we prove
to be unique in respect to a set of particular properties as
the basis of positional competition. Such a function is an
explicit relation between absolute and relative consumption
and incorporates the idea of diﬀerent levels of intensity for
the externalities produced by consumption. We identify four
main properties plus two additional features that a status func-
tion should possess. This allows us to completely describe the
equilibrium strategies for the allocation of positional goods in
game theoretic terms. We employ the status function to calcu-
late the consumption of positional goods that jointlymaximise
individuals’ statuses.
From a pure game theoretic point of view we also give
the solutions to approximated non-cooperative games for po-
sitional goods, exploiting the conditions of continuity of the
status function. After proving the existence of such approxi-
mations, we provide an extensive study on diverse concepts
of equilibrium (i.e. Nash, correlated and Bayes-Nash) and re-
mark on the relation with the non-approximated formulation
to the same allocation problem.
On the basis of a number of computer simulations, we
show that the aggregate distribution of goods assigned to the
players when an exogenous value for the positionality index is
provided, is Pareto-superior in consumption to the distribution
in presence of unrelated levels of positionality. In particular,
in the case of correlated equilibria we obtain solutions which
are Pareto-optimal. In our view these results confirm the ideas
in [12] and [9] that social regulations could prevent positional
competition from generating ineﬃcient solutions.
In conclusion of the game theoretic exposition, we ex-
amine a diﬀerent type of dynamic that emerges when each
individual’s positionality index has the only objective of con-
ditioning the consumption at equilibrium. We define the re-
sulting games as negotiable positionality index games, for
each player can opportunistically select the positionality in-
dex that increases his level of absolute consumption.
An important aspect of the status competition is repre-
sented by the possibility of aggregating in coalitions with the
goal of increasing the decisional power of the participants
in a coalition over a distribution of resources. As remarked
in [12] and [9] there is a loss of eﬃciency in the compet-
itive consumption of positional goods when compared to a
cooperative solution; therefore, in general, social regulations
and policies are required to prevent the over-consumption of
positional resources.
Again in [8], the author remarks on the validity of the
principle of the invisible hand, which is valid only in the
special case where each individual’s rewards are completely
independent from the choices made by others. We provide a
mechanism for the rational adjustment of the levels of con-
sumption that increases the eﬃciency of the competitive so-
lution. Such a mechanism allows the formation of coalitions
after the competitive process has ended. We show that the
limit to the presence of stable coalitions (those where no in-
dividual can increase his status by free riding) is the Nash
solution to the bargaining problem.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows
Section 2 provides the definition of positionality index
and introduces the model of absolute consumption.
Sections 3 and 4 investigate the properties of a status
function and its mathematical formulation.
Section 5 defines the conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium point in non-cooperative games for positional
goods.
In section 6 we propose the equilibrium approximations
for the game discussed in the preceeding section and present
some results and their significance in relation to the non-
approximated game; in particular section 6.2 gives a formu-
lation of the problem of positional allocation of goods in the
presence of incomplete information.
In section 7we relax the property of non-tradability [12] to
introduce the novel concept of equilibrium in negotiable po-
sitionality index games when players’ positional engagement
is not a-priori determined.
Sections 8 and 9 describe the cooperative mechanism to
adjust the positional distribution and, eventually, in the final
section we discuss the concepts we developed and draw the
conclusions to our work.
2. Positionality Index
According to [2] and [10], positionality is a binary feature,
for a good is either used to signal one’s own social status, or it
is a consumption good. In this work we utilise the extension of
this concept to a continuous range of degrees of positionality,
representing the diverse intensity in the generated externali-
ties.
We assume that, for any good, there exists a relation be-
tween its power of signalling one’s status and the intensity of
generated externalities. Thus, in this perspective every good
is positional, it is the intensity of its signalling capability, and
hence of the level of consequent externalities, that varies.
The spectrum of such magnitude spans from public to
private to positional, with an infinite scale of intermediate
variations. To represent the positional component we intro-
duce a positionality index (pi), formally a real number, which
measures and orders goods according to the signalling power
(generated externalities) perceived (produced) by the agent
who consumes it.
By definition, the consumption of a good with pi = 0 pro-
duces positive externalities for other individuals and thus it
is a model of public good; private goods are associated with
pi = 1 for the consumption is not used to signal one’s own
social status. Eventually pi > p¯i are positional goods in the
sense of Hirsch. Goods which are associated to non-extreme
pi have to be considered decisive in defining one’s own status
according to the natural ordering of R.
Table 1 summarises the diﬀerent meanings of the posi-
tionality index.
In this work we consider the positional component as
the exponent of the absolute consumption: qi(σ)pi , with
σ = (σi,σ−i) ∈ Σ that represent a point in the joint mixed
strategy set and with qi(σ) concave in σi .
The extension of the concept of positionality introduces
the necessity of a more general framework for the analysis of
multi player competition for goods; in fact, it is not necessar-
ily true that the distribution of a positional good shall result
in a zero-sum game [11]. There may exist goods which are
more socially or naturally abundant that, however, are utilised
to manifest social status.
Another assumption is to consider the social status pro-
duced by the consumption of zero units of a public good,
equivalent to the consumption of one unit of any other type
goods. Though this assumption may not be completely real-
istic, for it appears to be better for a status-seeking individual
to possess no units of a public good rather than one unit of a
good with high positionality, it helps us solve mathematical
irregularities. In this work we consider qi(σ) > 1 ∈ R.
With this formulation, we have a categorisation of goods
according to their positionality and a clear distinction between
the absolute level of consumption and the positional value of
such consumption. We need now to explicitly include the rel-
ative distribution of goods in order to produce an expressive
economicmodel for status-seeking competition in accordance
to [12]. For these reasons we introduce the status function.
3. Status function
In our model every non-private good, pi , 1, can be re-
placed by a fictitious good without positionality pi = 1. Thus
competing for positional goods results in a competition for
private goods where the distribution of such goods are modi-
fied according to the positionality index and the relative con-
sumption. The transformation from a game of positional con-
sumption to the corresponding competition for private goods
is realised by means of a status function: δi(σ, pi).
3.1. Properties
There are some fundamental properties that a status func-
tion must satisfy in order to express the dynamics of posi-
tional competition. The following set extends the list provided
in [12]:
1. Invariance: Individuals’ absolute consumption of non
positional goods are invariants under the status trans-
formation. ∀σ ∈ Σ if pi = 1 then δi(σ,1) = qi(σ)
2. Exclusivity: Individual’s status for high positional
goods increases as the distribution gets more exclusive.
∃σ0,σ1 ∈ Σ such that ∑j∈N qj(σ0) = ∑j∈N qj(σ1)
and qi(σ0) = qi(σ1),∀i ∈ N , then δi(σ0, pi) ≥ δi(σ1, pi)
if and only if
∑
j∈N qj(σ0)pi ≤
∑
j∈N qj(σ1)pi
3. Simmetry: If there is no diﬀerence in the relative dis-
tribution of a good for all pi, then individuals’ absolute
consumption is unchanged after the status transforma-
tion. ∃σ ∈ Σ such that qi(σ) = qk(σ) with i , k,
∀i, k ∈ N , then δi(σ, pi) = δk(σ,pi)
4. Eﬃciency: In each state the sum of individual’s distri-
bution is equal to the total amount of available good.
∀σ ∈ Σ∑i∈N δi(σ,pi) = ∑i∈N qi(σ)
There exists no codified method to evaluate the positionality
index, for it may depend on subjective evaluations or tradi-
tions which could be diﬃcult to measure [8]. The scope of
this work is to define a coherent model to analyse the dynam-
ics of competition for Veblen goods for which a positionality
measure is given.
3.2. Mathematical formulation
Duesenberry’s hypothesis of relative income and Pol-
lack’s model [13] are the simplest way to incorporate relative
preferences into a utility function. In this model the innovative
element is the introduction of the averge consumption in so-
ciety (c¯) as a reference point to calculate the relative position.
Formally, u(c, c/(c¯))where marginal utility is positive in both
arguments and c/c¯ is the relative position.
Following this model, we define the relative distribution
as dependent not only on the level on consumption but also on
the positionality index assigned by each individual to his level
of consumption. Therefore q
pi
i (σ)∑
j∈N qpij (σ) represents the measure
of relative concerns that player i assigns to his distribution
qi . Here we present the mathematical expression of the sta-
tus function as an explicit relation of absolute consumption
q, positionality index pi and relative consumption as defined
above.
δi(σ,pi) =
qpii (σ)∑
j∈N qpij (σ)
∑
j∈N
qj(σ) (1)
where σ ∈ Σ is point in the joint action set, qk is player k’s
absolute consumption, pi is the positionality index and N is
the total number of players. In relation with the characteristics
of the positionality index exposed in the previous section, let
us consider the simple example where two individuals have,
respectively, the following level of absolute consumptions of
some positional good: (4,2).
With the formulation of status function in 1 it is easy
to show that when pi = 0, then relation (2) in [8] emerges:
δ1(. ,0) = δ2(. ,0) = 3, which is exactly the definition of
public goods. If pi = 1 then of course the standard private
goods consumption levels are obtained, thus δ1(. ,1) = 4 and
δ2(. ,1) = 2; and, eventually, if pi is suﬃciently high pˆi, then a
strict competitive distribution is realised, for δ1(. , pˆi) = 6 and
δ2(. , pˆi) = 0, which is a form of zero-sum game as required
by Pagano.
We prove now the theorem that verifies that 1 is equipped
with the features we have just defined.
Function 1 satisfies all the properties of a status function.
We shall prove that properties 1-4 hold for 1.
Invariance.
δi(σ,1) = qi(σ)∑
j∈N qj(σ)
∑
j∈N
u j(σ) = qi(σ)
Exclusivity. It is a two-sided relation. Let us begin with the if
condition:
1∑
j∈N qj(σ0)pi
≥ 1∑
j∈N qj(σ1)pi
multiplying LHS by qi(σ0)pi ∑j∈N qj(σ0) and RHS by
qi(σ1)pi ∑j∈N qj(σ1) which are equal we obtain:
δi(σ0, pi) ≥ δi(σ1, pi)
And for the only if condition:
qi(σ0)pi∑
j∈N u j(σ0)pi
∑
j∈N
qj(σ0) ≥ qi(σ
1)pi∑
j∈N qj(σ1)pi
∑
j∈N
qj(σ1)
when
∑
j∈N qj(σ0) =
∑
j∈N qj(σ1) and qi(σ0) = qi(σ1),
∀i ∈ N it reduces to:∑
j∈N
qj(σ0)pi ≥
∑
j∈N
qj(σ1)pi
Symmetry.
qi(σ) = qk(σ)
If we raise both sides to the power of pi and multiply by∑
j∈N qj (σ)∑
j∈N qj (σ)pi , then we have:
δi(σ, pi) = qi(σ)pi
∑
j∈N qj(σ)∑
j∈N qj(σ)pi
= qk(σ)pi
∑
j∈N qj(σ)∑
j∈N qj(σ)pi
= δk(σ, pi)
Eﬃciency∑
i∈N
δi(σ,pi) =
∑
i∈N
qi(σ)pi∑
j∈N qj(σ)pi
∑
i∈N
qi(σ) = 1
∑
i∈N
qi(σ)
And this concludes the proof.
As aforementioned we prove that the status function de-
fined above is also the unique formulation that possesses the
features we required.
Function 1 is the only function that satisfies properties
1-4.
Let us suppose that there exists a function δ′ that pos-
sesses properties 1-4 and it is diﬀerent from δ. If this is the
case, then by the property of eﬃciency:∑
i∈N
δ′i∈N (σ,pi) =
∑
i∈N
δi∈N (σ, pi)
Let’s rule out the case where pi = ®1 (invariance), for in that
case δ′ = δ. This leaves us with the following relation:
δ′l (σ,pi) + δ′m(σ, pi) = δl(σ,pi) + δm(σ, pi)
Let us suppose that (i) δ′
l
(σ, pi) > δl(σ,pi), and obviously
δ′m(σ, pi) < δm(σ, pi). Let us also assume that there exist two
states σ1,σ2 ∈ Σ such that (ii) qj(σ1)pi = qj(σ2)pi = qj(σ)pi ;
therefore we have δ′
l
(σ, pi) = δl(σ1, pi) > δl(σ,pi) and
δ′m(σ, pi) = δm(σ2, pi) < δm(σ,pi). But if this is the case,
by (i) and the property of exclusivity we have
∑
qj(σ2)pi <∑
qj(σ)pi and ∑ qj(σ1)pi > ∑ qj(σ)pi , which contradict (ii).
This means that all states σ,σ1,σ2 must have the same ex-
clusivity, therefore δ′ = δ.
So far we have defined a comprehensive tool for the de-
scription of positional goods in all their forms (public, private
and positional) by means of a simple mathematical relation.
Here we show that the formulation in 1 is also featured with
the following extra properties:
• Separation: Diﬀerences in relative distribution of
goods with a high positionality index are magnified
by the status transformation. (i) if ∃σ ∈ Σ such that
qi(σ) − qk(σ) = C > 0 for some k ∈ N , then δi(σ,pi) −
δk(σ,pi) ≥ C when pi ≥ pˆi ≥ 1. (ii) if pi1 > pi0 > pˆi and
∃σ ∈ Σ such that qi(σ) − ql(σ) = C for some k ∈ N ,
then δi(σ, pi1) − δi(σ,pi1) ≥ δi(σ,pi0) − δi(σ,pi0)
• Equality: Diﬀerences in relative distribution of goods
with a low positionality index are reduced by the status
transformation. (i) if ∃σ ∈ Σ such that qi(σ)− qk(σ) =
C > 0 for some k ∈ N , then δi(σ, pi) − δk(σ, pi) ≤ C
when pi ≤ pˆi ≤ 1. (ii) if 1 > pi1 > pi0 and ∃σ ∈ Σ
such that qi(σ) − ql(σ) = C for some k ∈ N , then
δi(σ,pi1) − δi(σ, pi1) ≤ δi(σ, pi0) − δi(σ,pi0)
One may easily notice that these extra features are essential
to include the complete triad of economic goods within our
framework.
Function 1 satisfies the additional properties of separation
and equality
The proof is straightforward.
Separation. Let us write the condition on absolute con-
sumption in the following way: qi(σ) = qk(σ) −C. Therefore
we can express condition (i) on the status function as:
qi(σ)pi − (qi(σ) − C)pi
qi(σ)pi − (qi(σ) − C)pi (2qi(σ) − C) ≥ C
qi(σ)pi − Cqi(σ)pi−1 ≥ (qi(σ) − C)pi
The latter inequality is verified when (i) pi > pˆi, for it tends to
2qi(σ) − C ≥ C which is always true; and (ii) by the proper-
ties of asymptotic functions, the LHS of the former inequality
increases as pi increases.
Equality. We need to invert the verse of the second inequal-
ity from the previous property to prove that (i) when pi → 0
then the LHS of qi(σ)pi − Cqi(σ)pi−1 ≤ (qi(σ) − C)pi tends
to 1 − Cqi (σ) and the RHS tends to 1 which always verifies the
inequality. To prove (ii) we use the same argument we used to
prove the second part of separation.
Let us consider the example depicted by the game to sum-
marise all the properties of the status function:(
8,8,8 7,7,2
7,5,4 12,12,1
) (
6,6,7 1,5,12
12,1,12 4,4,4
)
The properties of invariance and eﬃciency are straight-
forward. To show exclusivity let’s consider σ0 = (1,0,1)
and σ1 = (0,1,1) and a positionality index pi > 1. In
these points the condition of exclusivity are met. Addition-
ally, in σ1 player 1’s distribution is much more exclusive
than in σ0 for
∑
j∈N qj(σ0)pi ≤
∑
j∈N qj(σ1)pi . Therefore
δ1(σ1, pi) = 17pi+5pi+4pi > 17pi+7pi+2pi = δ1(σ0, pi).
We utilise the state σ1 = (1,1,1) to show the property
of symmetry since the relative distribution is the same for
every player ( 13 , 13 , 13 ) and, absolute consumptions are respec-
tively q1(σ1) = q2(σ1) = 8. Hence δi(σ1, pi) = δk(σ1, pi) = 8,
∀i, k, pi.
Let us assume we have two positionality indices pi0 = 2
and pi1 = 5. In σ1 = (0,1,1) the following condition holds
q1(σ1) − q2(σ1) = 7 − 5 = 2. Then δ1(σ1, pi0) − δ2(σ1, pi0) =
72−52
72+52+42 (7 + 5 + 4) > 2. Moreover δ1(σ1, pi1) − δ2(σ1, pi1) =
75−55
75+55+45 (7 + 5 + 4) > 7
2−52
72+52+42 (7 + 5 + 4) > 2. For the same
reason if we invert the inequalities we have in the same point
σ1 the property of equality.
4. Generalised status function
As remarked in the introductory section, it is not always
the case that the intensity of externalities produced by an in-
dividual’s consumption of positional goods is equal to the
intensity of the balancing externality perceived by others.
Hence the generalisation of the concept of status function 1
to a broader function, which takes as second argument a vec-
tor of positionality indeces, one for each player appears to be
quite obvious. We define the generalised status function as:
δi(σ,pi) =
qpiii (σ)∑
j∈N q
pij
j (σ)
∑
j∈N
qj(σ) (2)
where σ ∈ Σ is point in the joint action set, qk is player k’s
absolute consumption, pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , piN ) is the vector of
individual positionality indeces and N is the total number of
participants.
As a conclusive remark on the concept of positionality
index, we state that certain values of pi identify the type of
good and diﬀerences in the values of the elements of pi are
measures for the externalities produced by the consumption.
Now that we have setted the formal basis to describe the
competition for positional goods, we can start analysing the
equilibrium concepts that arise. In the following sections we
provide both exact and approximated solutions to the problem
presented so far.
5. Equilibrium point
The following theoremguarantees the presence of an equi-
librium strategy in the transformed game. We are interested
in finding the equilibrium points of the transformed game,
because the equilibrium profile of the transformed game rep-
resents the stable absolute consumption of a positional good.
Hence, we are assured that such profile is also the equilibrium
point in absolute consumption. We assumed that qi(σ) is a
concave function in σi . Therefore the following must hold:
Every game in private goods Gδ = δ(G,pi), derived from
the transformation of a game in absolute consumption G by
means of δ has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
To prove this theorem we must first consider the status
function as an application on absolute consumption. Since
by construction, the set defined by qi(σ) is compact, for it
is the image of a continuous transformation on the compact
set Σ, we can apply Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem, [14],
to assure that the game Gδ has a Nash equilibrium at least in
mixed strategy. We are interested in the conditions for which
an equilibrium point exists in pure strategies.
δi is a non decreasing function in the good allocation
qi(σ), for its first derivative with respect to qi is:
qi(σ)pii + piiqi(σ)pii−1
(∑
j∈N qj(σ)
)∑
j∈N qj(σ)pij
−
piiqi(σ)2pii−1
(∑
j∈N qj(σ)
)
(∑
j∈N qj(σ)pij
)2
(3)
which is always non-negative. Moreover qi(σ) is a concave
function. Since every monotone transformation of a concave
function is quasiconcave, then δi(σ,pi) is quasiconcave in σi .
If this is the case then a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
always exists.
Given the result in this theorem, the equilibrium point of
the non-positional game, σ∗, represents the strategy profile in
the positional gameG(σ∗) in which no player can increase his
status by changing the level of absolute consumption when
his opponents don’t deviate. Our formulation is in accordance
with [1] where the status function is required to be concave
in the absolute consumption.
The Nash equilibrium of the game represents a stable
solution, which means that is self-enforced: no player has in-
terest in deviating from the equilibrium profile. However it
might not be eﬃcient. There exists a broad discussion in the
literature analysing the non-optimality of the Nash solution.
Perhaps the most well-known non-cooperative game, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, has been used in several occasions to
exploit the weaknesses of individualistic rationality [15]; an-
other classic example is represented by the Tragedy of the
commons in which utility maximisation brings a whole soci-
ety to collapse.
To reduce these ineﬃciecies, in the next section we in-
vestigate another class of game approximating the procedure
depicted in ??. We state that such an approximation is always
possible and we discuss the results of some simulations show-
ing that under certain conditions, a Pareto-optimal solution in
absolute consumption can be obtained.
6. Equilibrium approximations
In order to study the approximation of Gδ , we need to
define the finite status function by considering 1 in the re-
stricted set of joint pure strategies S ⊂ Σ, where each point
s = (si, s−i) ∈ S is defined using the standard convention.
Then we extend this definition, and propose the expected sta-
tus function as:
Di(σ,pi) =
∑
si ∈Si
σ(s)δi(s,pi) (4)
where σ(s) = σi(si)σ−i(s−i) ∈ Σ is the joint probability mea-
sure assigned to the pure strategy s = (si, s−i) ∈ S. Again
Σ = ×i∈NΣi where Σi is the |Si |-dimensional simplex. The
game represented by Di is a α-approximation of a game rep-
resented by δi , where ‖Di(σ,pi) − δi(σ,pi)‖ ≤ α. Therefore
in this perspective any equilibrium point of GD is an approx-
imation of the equilibria in Gδ and thus is an approximated
solution to the problem of positional competition.
There always exists a α-approximationGD of aGδ game.
Di and δi are continuous function defined on a compact
set Σ, hence their image is also a compact set which is also a
subset of R. If this is the case, then α ∈ R is always a positive
real number.
All the equilibriumpoints defined for theα-approximation
games are related to the original game in status functions by
the Fudenberg-Levine theorem:
If σ∗ is a ϵ-equilibrium of the α-approximated game, then
it is a (ϵ + 2α)-equilibrium of the original game.
In our case, since 4 allow the calculation of exact solu-
tions to the approximated game (i.e. ϵ = 0), we can conclude
that the equilibria of GD are 2α-equilibria of the original
positional game.
With these settings we can apply the classic equilibrium
concepts of finite game theory to analyse the optimality con-
ditions of the approximated solution.
6.1. Equilibrium concepts
When pi is common knowledge then we define a non-
cooperative game in which each player maximises his own
expected status function, given individuals’ positionality in-
dex and resource absolute consumptions.
Every α-approximation GD of a game in the absolute
consumption of positional goods has a Nash equilibrium:
Di(σ∗i ,σ∗−i,pi) ≥ Di(σi,σ∗−i,pi) (5)
Due to the particular form of the expected status function,
the proof is quite straightforward.
δi(s,pi) is a mapping from the set of joint pure strategies
S to the set of real numbers. Moreover Di(σi,σ−i,pi) is con-
cave in σi ∈ Σi , hence the conditions of validity of the Nash
theorem are satisfied and an equilibrium point always exists.
Here we remark the existence of correlated equilibria not
just as a mathematical exercise but because the results of the
simulations clearly show a powerful connection between the
correlated equilibrium strategy and Pareto-optimality.
Every α-approximationGD of a game in the absolute con-
sumption of positional goods has a correlated equilibrium:∑
ω∈Ω
qi(w)δi(s∗i , s∗−i, pi) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
qi(w)δi(si, s∗−i, pi) (6)
Every Nash equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium.
If Theorem 6.1 is true then the corollary is also verified.
Let us consider the following example of game in absolute
consumption: (
4,2 3,3
1,5 1,1
)
Let us assume for simplicity that pi = pi is equal for all players.
The game in absolute consumption has only one Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies which is (1,0). Let us further assume
that both players assign a low positionality index to the posi-
tional good at stake; if this is the case, we should expect small
diﬀerences in their status functions, since the positional com-
petition tends to a competition for public goods. Therefore let
us set pi = 0. Thus the matrix of the associated game results:(
3,3 3,3
3,3 1,1
)
This new game has three Nash equilibria in (1,1), (1,0) and
(0,1) and, moreover, all equilibria provide the same payoﬀs
to both players. This means exactly that each player in the
original game is indiﬀerent to any outcome which gives him
a non-null allocation.
Whenwe have a generic set of values for pi = (pi1, . . . , piN ),
then the competitive dynamics might change. In fact, let us
suppose that player 1 assigns a low positionality index the
good at stake, pi1 = 1/2 and player 2 gives a high positional
value to the same good, pi2 = 3. If this is the case, the matrix
associated to the game is:
6 ×
(
41/2
41/2+23 ,
23
41/2+23
31/2
31/2+33 ,
33
31/2+33
1
1+53 ,
53
1+53 1/6,1/6
)
We can see that there exists only one Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies, which is (85/100,35/100).
Once again, these results signify that the equilibrium
points calculated in GD are 2α-equilibrium points for the
correspondent original games in absolute consumption.
6.1.1. Optimal positionality index
Recalling the studies reported in [6] and, utilising our for-
mulation of the positionality index, we can add a diﬀerent
meaning to pi when it is an exogenous parameter provided by
an external entity (i.e. society).
In fact, if the positionality index is a-priori imposed to
the players, then we can model competitive dynamics in the
presence of social regulation or practice policies. Depending
on the dynamic that a designer desires to implement, the se-
lection of a value of pi could result in diﬀerent choices. Our
main focus is in finding the conditionswhich create an optimal
allocation in the absolute consumption.
Other possible dynamics could be: the reduction of in-
equalities among the relative levels of consumption, the se-
lection of a monopolist or leader coalitions or competition for
pure private goods.
In the experimental part of our work we have consid-
ered the values of pi which maximise the welfarian absolute
consumption of goods. Let us take the Prisoner’s Dilemma
depicted by: (
5,5 1,6
6,1 2,2
)
and consider the situation where pi = 0; with this configura-
tion then the absolute consumption matrix transforms into the
following: (
5,5 7/2,7/2
7/2,7/2 2,2
)
It is easy to notice that there is only one Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies of the game, which is the point (1,1). This
point is also Pareto eﬃcient, since there is no other state in
which every player can increase his own status, hence pi = 0
is an optimal positionality index.
Here we discuss the results of a series of computer simu-
lations in which the 2α-equilibrium is calculated for a big set
of 3 × 2 games with random levels of absolute consumption.
In particular, for each game, we compare the price of stabil-
ity of the original game in comsumption, where the good is
considered non-positional pi = 1, to that of the same game
in consumption, where the good is positional and the value
of pi is statically assigned in order to maximise the welfarian
absolute consumption of such goods. The price of stability
is used as a measure of eﬃciency of the solution and in our
frameset is defined as:
PoS =
value of best equilibrium
value of optimal solution
≥ 1 (7)
Eventually we consider the Nash and the correlated solutions
to the generated games.
The simulation setting is as follows:
• 500 3 × 2 games with rational payoﬀs comprised be-
tween 1 and 20;
• pi∗ equal for every player from the set Π∗ = [0,20]
that maximise the total consumption of players, i.e.∑
i∈N qi(σ∗).
Figure 1 compares the values of the PoS, respectively for
the Nash and correlated equilibria, in the non-positional game
with the PoS of the same gamewhere the optimal positionality
index is given.
From these figures it is evident that by conditioning the
positionality index it is possible to increment the eﬃciency of
the equilibrium point in absolute consumption, in particular
when players have the intention to correlate their strategy, the
level of consumption reaches the Pareto optimal frontier. In
our view, such a result verifies how public regulations and
common policies, which have eﬀect on the value of pi, indeed
influences the strategic behaviour, as explained in [12], [9]
and [11]. We also verified that both equilibrium concepts, i.e.
Nash and correlated equilibria, provide a higher value for the
total absolute consumption.
6.2. Games with incomplete information
When pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , piN ) is not common knowledge,
and has a probability associated to each component, then
we define incomplete information positional game as a non-
cooperative game in which each player maximises his own
expected generalised status function given his type and the
types of his opponents.
We distinguish two cases within the framework of games
with incomplete information: (i) each type is associated to a
value of pi, hence θ j = pij and, (ii), to each type is associated
more than one value of pi with some probability p(pik |θ j).
Extending the notation provided in 2, the expected gen-
eralised status function when each type has only one pi as-
sociated to it, we have: Di(si, s−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) where θ j =
pij . This represents the average status function for player i
when all other players −i are given a type θ−i . In a sim-
ilar fashion we define the expected status function where
each type is associated with an arbitrary number of pi as:
Di(si, s−i(θ−i, pi−i(θ−i)), θi, θ−i, pii(θi), pi−i(θ−i). In this case the
formula represents the average status function for player i of
type θi and with positionality index pii when all other players
−i are given a type θ−i and a positionality index pi−i which is
associated to the particular type with a known probability.
Hence, we define one Bayesian-Nash equilbrium point in
each of the two cases: for case (i):
s∗i (θi) ∈ arg max
si ∈Si
∑
Θ−i
p(θ−i |θi)Di(si, s∗−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) (8)
And for case (ii):
s∗i (θi, pii(θi)) ∈ arg max
si ∈Si
∑
Π−i
∑
Θ−i
p(θ−i |θi)p(pi−i(θ−i)|θ−i)
Di(si, s∗−i(θ−i, pi−i(θ−i)), θi, θ−i, pii(θi), pi−i(θ−i))
(9)
with the natural extension to non-finite types and positionality
indeces. In case (i) the existence of a Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium point is guaranteed byHarsanyi’s Theorem.Additionally
it is easy to show that even case (ii) always admits an equilib-
rium point. Indeed, having a number |Θ| of types with |Π(Θ)|
positionality indeces associated to them, it is equivalent to
have a number of types |Θ′ | = |Θ| × |Π(Θ)|, which is the
same settings we have in case (i).
This concludes the discussion on the approximated equi-
librium points. We have investigated three diﬀerent scenarios
which required three diﬀerent equilibrium concepts and, for
each of them we showed the consistency of our framework.
In the next section we introduce a novel equilibrium con-
cept, in which each player keeps the information on his own
positionality index private. Such a concept is applicable to
both approximated and non-approximated game sets. For rea-
sons of clarity we consider examples from the class of ap-
proximated games which are more manageable to discuss.
7. Negotiable positionality index
In this section, we consider the situation inwhich the value
of the positionality index is not only private information, but
each player i can opportunistically select a value of pii ∈ R
that maximise his own status at the equilibrium. As reported
in [9], citing Sen, the numbers in the payoﬀ matrix can be
interpreted simply as welfare indices of the two person and
each person’s welfare index can incorporate concern for the
other. (italics added).
Indeed, as previously discussed, the theory of utility
is broad enough to incorporate other-regarding preferences;
however, what we propose in this paper is the explicit rela-
tion between absolute consumption of some positional good
and the social status that derives from such consumption. It
is by following this approach that the equilibrium dynamics
discussed here arise.
As an example let us consider the game of Chicken defined
by the matrix: (
1,1 7,2
2,7 6,6
)
This game in absolute consumption has two pure strategies
Nash equilibria (1,0) and (0,1). To find the non positional
corresponding game we should apply the status tranformation
with some value of pi. But let us assume that each player i
can independently select the value of pii; let us also assume
that no communication on the values of pi is allowed. Then,
if player 2 chooses pi2 = 0, then player 1 prefers to play his
second row, since: {
3 7pi17pi1+1 < 4
6pi1
6pi1+1
1 < 9 2pi12pi1+1
(10)
which is true ∀pi1. However to avoid player 2 to select his first
column player 1 should select pi1 = 0, for if this is the case:{
3 7pi27pi2+1 < 4
6pi2
6pi2+1
1 < 9 2pi22pi2+1
(11)
which is true ∀pi2. In conclusion, the point (σ∗1 ,σ∗2 , pi∗1, pi∗2) =(0,0,0,0) is an equilibrium combination. We use the term
combination to underline the fact that the solution is a combi-
nation of strategies and pi. Obviously this behaviour becomes
visible only if one considers the status tranformation of a
game in absolute consumption.
The following theorem guarantees that an equilibrium
point in this scenario always exists.
Every game with negotiable positionality index has an
equilibrium point:{
δi(σ∗i ,σ∗−i,pi∗) ≥ δi(σi,σ∗−i,pi∗)
δi(σ∗i ,σ∗−i, pi∗i , pi∗−i) ≥ δi(σ∗i ,σ∗−i, pii, pi∗−i)
(12)
This result is true in both approximated and non-
approximated games, thus the equilibrium equations 12would
have validity when Di substitutes δi .
If there is no pi∗ , ®1 that satisfies the second condition
of 12, then obviously, for pi∗ = ®1, the second condition of
12 is satisfied, hence the problem reduces to finding a Nash
equilibrium, which does always exist as shown in Theorem
6.1.
In case each player i’s selection of an "appropriate" po-
sitionality index is bounded in some closed subset of R, the
following corollary holds:
If ∃pi ∈ B¯r (®0), r ≥ 1 such that conditions in 12 are met,
then there exists an equilibrium point.
As an example let us consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma
defined by the following matrix, with B¯r (®0) being the 2-
dimensional sphere with centre in (0,0) and radius r = 3:(
5,5 1,6
6,1 2,2
)
Player 2 would force player 1 to play first row, in order to
obtain an outcome of 6 by playing second column. Therefore
if player 2 picks pi2 = 0 then ∀pi1 ∈ [0,3] player 1 prefers to
play first row for:
λ2
5pi110
5pi1 + 1
+ (1 − λ2) 1
pi17
1pi1 + 1
≥ λ2 6
pi17
6pi1 + 1
+ (1 − λ2) 2
pi14
2pi1 + 1
(13)
is verified ∀λ2 ∈ [0,1]. But if player 1 is forced to play his
first row, he does not want player 2 to play second column,
hence he needs to find a value of pi1 that solve the inequality:
λ1
10
5pi1 + 1
+ (1 − λ1) 76pi1 + 1 ≥ λ1
7
1pi1 + 1
+ (1 − λ1) 42pi1 + 1
(14)
For pi1 = 0, the expression in 14 is verified. The same argu-
ment is valid if we start from player 1. At this point no player
can increase his expected absolute consumption by chang-
ing his positionality index or his strategy, hence the point
(σ∗1 ,σ∗2 , pi∗1, pi∗2) = (1,1,0,0) is an equilibrium combination. If
we allow B¯r (®0) and r > 5 then (σ∗1 ,σ∗2 , pi∗1, pi∗2) is no longer
an equilibrium, for player i will not be forced to change his
strategy from the classic Nash equilibrium profile.
Eventually, we provide the following lemma whose proof
is already contained in the peculiar definition of an equilib-
rium point with negotiable positionality index.
In a game with negotiable positionality index, there exists
an equilibrium point that is at least as eﬃcient as any Nash
equilibrium of the game in absolute consumption.
The equilibrium points described by 7 represent a rational
response to the boundedness deriving from some constraints
on the choice of the positionality index. From [9]: charac-
terising a certain ’object’ as a good or a bad, as a private or
public good, as a relational or positional good or as a posi-
tive or negative externality always critically depends on the
subjective value-system of the agents.
As we seen in the previous sections, the positionality in-
dex is indeed a measure of the agent’s perception of a good he
is consuming. Therefore by following Zarri’s logics, it should
be easy to notice that a full interpretation of the concepts
described in this section, is represented by his definition of
"extended payoﬀs", which include preferential moral princi-
ples (i.e. the restriction on the selection of pi).
This concludes our exposition on the non-cooperative as-
pects of the positional competition. In the next two sections
we describe a cooperative methods for the allocation of posi-
tionals good and a coalition-based mechanism that is limited
in eﬃciency by the Nash solution to the bargaining problem.
8. The bargaining solution
As intended by [17], a bargaining situation involves two
individuals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mu-
tual benefit; additionally no action taken by one individuals
without the consent of the other can aﬀect the well-being of
the other one. Again, a solution means a determination of the
amount of satisfaction each individual should expect to get
from the situation, or, rather, a determination of how much
it should be worth to each of these individuals to have this
opportunity to bargain.
We define the distribution set X = {x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xN )|∑i∈N xi = K}; obviously X is compact. Let
us consider the disagreement point to be d = ®1. The status
function on the distribution set is then defined as δi(x,pi) ∈ ∆.
The set ∆ is the image of a compact set via a continuous func-
tion, hence it is also compact.
If this is the case then we can define the Nash product
in [17] for status functions as:
f S(∆, d) =
∏
i∈N
(δi(x,pi) − 1) (15)
To find the bargaining solution to the problem of allocating re-
sources according to the status function is equivalent to solve
the following maximisation problem:
max
δ1 ,...,δN
f s(∆, d) (16)∑
i∈N
xi = K
We consider only situations in which either every player has
a zero positionality index or no player has a zero positionality
index, for in all other cases there is no real competition since
at least one player has no interests in the consumption of the
good.We show that in case where at least one player has a null
positionality index, the second order condition for optimality
are never met.
A solution to this problem always exists for it is defined
on a compact set and f s is continuous since it is the product
of continuous functions. It is interesting to see the dynamics
of the bargaining process for diﬀerent positionality indeces.
Let us analyse the problemwith two players: the extension
to many players is straightforward. Solutions to this problem
should satisfy the first order conditions for optimality, there-
fore:
δ′1(x,pi)
1 − δ1(x,pi) =
δ′2((K − x),pi)
δ2((K − x),pi) − 1 (17)
which reduces to the simple relation: (K − x)pi2 = xpi1 . And
the second order conditions in the stationary points:
δ′′1 (x,pi)(δ2(x,pi)−δ1(x,pi))+δ′1(x,pi)(δ′2(x,pi)−δ′1(x,pi)) < 0
(18)
which is equal to −2δ′1(x,pi) < 0, additionally, for δ′1(x,pi)
is positive. The second order condition in case a player has
a null positionality index (i.e. pi2 = 0 , pi1) reduces to the
following relation:
Kpi1
x
− pi1
2
< 0 (19)
which resolves to the condition 2K < x when pi1 , 0 that is
outside of the feasible region.
It is now easy to notice that when pi1 = pi2 , 0 then there
exists a solution (K/2,K/2)which reflects the idea that if two
individuals evaluate the same good in the same manner, they
would fairly split the total amount.
In the case where pi1 = pi2 = 0 then every allocation is a
solution: again this is a reasonable situation for if both players
do not receive positionality by the consumption of the good
at stake, then every allocation is optimal.
The last dynamic is when pi1 , pi2 , 0. In this case, one
player gives a higher positionality index to the good, which
means that he gets more satisfaction per unit than his oppo-
nent: therefore it is not surprising that, in order to meet the
condition of optimality, the player with higher positionality
index will receive a smaller amount of good.
In the general case with more than two players the so-
lutions satify the first order condition: xpi11 = x
pi2
2 = . . . =(K −∑j,N xj)piN .
9. Coalitions
In [16], proposes a model of competition for status in
which status is exogenously distributed and individuals desire
to associate with those with high status. If status is yet de-
sirable, [12], then agents would prefer to form coalitions in
order to increase their own status.
A coalition forms when some subsets of players coopera-
tively aggregate their marginal level of consumption.
In particular, coalitions form when some players join their
allocations in order to increase the decisional power over a
distribution of positional goods. Each player in a coalition
owns a quota of goods, which is equal to his marginal level
of consumption with respect to the aggregate absolute con-
sumption of the coalition.
According to our definition of generalised status function
in 2 we must distinguish two types of coalitions, depend-
ing on the value of pi. There exists one-sided and two-sided
coalitions.
One-sided coalitions refer to situationswith commonfixed
positionality index described by 1; while two-sided coalitions
refers to situations described by 2.
The allocation of good related to themember of a coalition
CL results in:
CiL =
ui(σ∗)∑
l∈CL ul(σ∗)
(∑
l∈CL ul(σ∗)
)pi(∑
l∈CL ul(σ∗)
)pi
+
∑
m<CL um(σ∗)pi
∑
j∈N
u j(σ∗)
(20)
While a non-member of CL would receive an allocation ac-
cording to the relation:
Ci−L =
ui(σ∗)pi(∑
l∈CL ul(σ∗)
)pi
+
∑
m<CL um(σ∗)pi
∑
j∈N
u j(σ∗)
(21)
Moreover a coalition is stable if no player can increase his
allocation by deviating from the agreement.
As an example of one-sided coalition, let us consider a
3-player situation with fixed positionality index that prescribe
the following distribution of the positional good: [7,5,4].
If pi = 3, then the coalitions that form are reported in Ta-
ble 2. C0 is the null coalition, in the sense that is the solution
where there is no agreement. Values in Table 2 refer to the
coalition modification of the individuals status functions.
In this example the only two stable coalitions are: C23
and C123 for no player can increment his status by unilateral
deviation from the prescribed allocation.
To show two-sided coalition formation, let us consider
a 3-player situation with non fixed positionality index with
the same distribution prescribed in the previous example, but
with pi = (0,1,2).
The list of two-sided coalition is reported in Table 3:
The notation Ci→j indicates the coalition between player
i and j where i accepts to utilise j’s positionality index. In
this second example the only stable coalition is C0.
There is a precise relation between the stability of coali-
tions and the bargaining solution described by 17. In fact the
following proposition holds:
If C0 = f s(∆, d) then C0 is the only stable coalition.
To prove this theorem it is suﬃcient to use the property of
eﬃciency of the Nash solution to the bargaining problem. In
fact, if f s(∆, d) is eﬃcient, every modification to the current
allocation will cause some player to lose status and, eventu-
ally, all the resultant coalitions are unstable.
Moreover, since a coalition is a redistribution of a constant
allocation of good, it is obviously invariant under the Coase
theorem.
10. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a comprehensive frame-
work for the analysis of the competition for positional goods,
in the extended meaning of the term. We have shown how to
incorporate the information on positionality using the concept
of positionality index (pi) and, we have characterised the val-
ues of such an index which are able to describe the consump-
tion of the three diﬀerent types of economic goods (private,
public and positional). We have provided a relation, the status
function δ, for the understanding of the strategic behaviour in
the presence of positional goods, and we have analysed the
equilibrium strategies in such game forms. Additionally we
have defined the approximations of positional games, which
are defined by the expected status function D. We have shown
some theoretical facts for the α-approximations and then the
results of computer simulation that we used to evaluate the
impact of the positional competition on the absolute consump-
tion. Eventually we have described a mechanism to increase
the eﬃciency of the distribution of positional goods based on
the possibility to create coalitions; again, we have provided
upper bounds to the forming of coalitions.
In this conclusive section we underline the property of
our framework for which, when pi = ®1, the classic dynamic
described in the economic models depicted by the authors
in [12] emerge. We believe that our framework is general
enough to describe a wide range of strategic behaviours that
might deviate from the standard non positional competition,
and it has the advantage of being self-contained.
A promising field of application of the models proposed
in this work is that of digital economy. The rate at which social
interactions are migrating to the digital world is astounding.
As mentioned in [18] not only humans are using digital sup-
ports to interact with each other, but they are more and more
interacting with intelligent algorithms. This multiplies the
number of samples that researcher might have access to and
produce a consistent base for analytical analysis. If economy
goes digital, then our models can serve many purposes, in
particular:
• make predictions about human behaviour (that is more
measurable as it reduces to human-machine interaction)
• create artificial intelligent algorithms that simulate hu-
man perception of economic goods, making themmore
economically aware subjects.
The future of the digital world suggests that each of us will
have an electronic code [18] and, a status function that will
allow us to express our preferences and calculate our deci-
sions.
Since the values of pi might depend on non-measureable
elements, we suggest that defining an eﬀectivemethod to eval-
uate the positionality index could reduce the risk of loss in
predictive power which is described as inevitable by [9] when
incorporating relative consumption in economic models. We
have given a definition for pi which allowed us to show the
diverse significance of positionality indices in relation to the
externalities produced by consumption, but the description of
a practice able to measure positionality is out of the scope of
this work.
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